第一篇:《Financial Risk Management Term Paper》
Pre-Global Crisis Risk Management in the Korean Banking Sector
崔珉祯
1000092808 2013-12-06
Though the memory is short, I clearly remember the day of the first and only negotiation with the IMF on Dec. 3rd, 1997. News on hundreds of thousands of people getting laid off, lots of them ended up committing suicide… Such tragedy not only left us a catastrophic memory but also had a tremendous influence on the regulatory system and the risk management in the financial sector. However, 10 years later, another global-scale economic turmoil blew in from the west and halved the entire market capital in 3 months. As a Korean finance student, I had assessed the efficiency and the validity of the risk management policies in between the two crises.
Introduction
As the 2008 financial crisis hit Korea, the GDP growth rate shrank negative 5.6 percent QoQ with substantial decrease in imports and exports. Also, the financial instability rose significantly as the Korean markets have been suffering from massive financial deleveraging. Furthermore, the Korean currency showed one of the highest depreciation rate. At the time of crisis, the banking sector went through a series of systematic problems; (1) a remarkably increasing short-term foreign debt, especially from 2006 onward; and (2) the highly leveraged banking sector joined by household debt that rose to 158 percent of disposable household income by the end of 2008, which is above the U.S. level (142 percent) and close to that in the United Kingdom (185 percent). What, then, went wrong in the Korean case?
In my opinion, since the Asian financial crisis (or IMF crisis in Korea), the government’s efforts in financial deregulation policies exposed the banking sector to external risks. More specifically, the risks rises from the government’s regulatory easing in foreign exchange market, both for capital inflows and outflows; the highly leveraged, external borrowing model of economic growth; couldn’t prevent the risks in rising foreign short-term borrowings;
The Exposure to Currency and Deleveraging Risks during the Global Financial Crisis
One of the most apparent impacts of the current global financial crisis was the sharp depreciation of the Korean currency. The real exchange rate of Korean Won depreciated 28% against dollar in 2008. Among all OECD countries, the Korean Won depreciated the most except for Iceland which declared bankruptcy during the crisis. Even among other Asian countries, the Korean Won depreciated most sharply.
First, the vulnerability of the Korean Won was partly attributed to the high degree of trade dependency. As it is portrayed in the following table, aggragate national trade, both import and export decelerated significantly in 2008, especially in the fourth quarter. The current account did not severely
deteriorate due to the sharper decrease in import than export, but the overall trade volume decreased rapidly in accordance with the global demand.
Korea’s Imports and Exports (in billion USD)
According to the bureau of commerce, the Chinese market has emerged as Korea’s single largest export market since 2002, replacing the U.S. market, and Korean exports to the European Union (EU) have been greater than its exports to the U.S. market since 2005. In 2007 about $100 billion in goods and services were exported by Korea to Hong Kong and mainland China. In total, exports to four major regions and countries—China, Japan, the EU, and the United States—make up more than 60 percent of Korean exports. Therefore, if these economies suffer, Korean exports will decrease, and the Korean economy will suffer. (Bank of Korea) Therefore, the sharp depreciation of the Korean Won is partly due to the trade dependency. However, from the below evidence of other similar sized countries that have higher trade dependency but did not suffer rapid depreciation, it is difficult to detect a direct correlation between trade dependency and currency risk.
―If we compare the trade-to-GDP ratio among OECD countries in 2006, for example, trade’s contribution to Korea’s GDP is about 85 percent, a middle range of trade dependency. Other small- or medium-size European countries such as Finland, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland, and Denmark also have a similar or high trade dependency ratio. In Asia, the exports-to-GDP ratios of Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand (Indonesia is not addressed here) are higher than that of Korea (Korea Economic Institute).‖
Second, the currency depreciation owes to the substantial outflow of capital. Along the global market, Korean financial markets have also been heavily hit by foreign investors’ retreating from their portfolio investment to Korea. As shown in the table of the overall trend of capital inflow and outflow below, in 2008, more than 50 billion dollars of capital flowed out of Korea. The huge withdrawal occurred in all tyes of foreign investment: FDI, portfolio investment, financial derivatives, and other kinds of investment. From 2001 to 2007, the financial account balance was consistently in surplus. During the first half of the period, from 2001 to 2004, the balance of portfolio investment was in large surplus contributing 60% of the total financial account. However, since 2005, even before 2008, FDI and portfolio investment started to downsize. During this second half, the increasingly freer inflow and outflow of capital become possible owing to aggressive liberalization policies in the foreign exchange market by the government. In 4 years, the deficit of portfolio investment increased 64 billion dollars in total. But the total balance of financial
account remains in surplus until 2008. This is because the large deficit in portfolio investment is offset by banks’ overseas short-term borrowings. These short-term borrowings are indicated as ―loans from abroad‖ included in ―balance of other investments‖.
Balance of Financial Account in Korea (in billion USD)
From this statistics, it can be concluded that the Korean financial markets have increased exposure to foreign flow of capital, leading to the highly leveraged status and thus, opening itself to sharp deleveraging risks at the crisis.
Financial Vulnerability in the Banking Sector
Various factors have contributed to the current massive deleveraging by foreigners from the Korean financial markets, but the following three aspects of the financial vulnerability of the Korean banking sector are notable: the rapid increase of short-term foreign debt, the increasing household debt, and the failed foreign exchange policy.
Sharp Increase of Short-term Foreign Debt
For the past decade, gross foreign debt has increased about 2.3 times—from 163.8 billion dollars to 380.5 billion dollars in 2008. During the same period, short-term foreign debt has increased from $39.5 billion to $151.0 billion (KSI).{1.63582E,19}.
Crediting the view of the ―Regional Economic Outlook‖(IMF), the accumulators of the short-term foreign loans were the branches of foreign banks. The outstanding short-term foreign borrowing mediated by domestic branches of foreign banks more than doubled from end 2005 to end 2006—$23.3 billion to $51.8 billion—and the gross amount of short-term foreign borrowing through the branches of foreign banks started to exceed that of domestic banks beginning in 2006. It reached almost $80 billion by the end of 2007 and started to decrease in 2008 (IMF).
However, the Korean government has claimed that this foreign borrowing by domestic branches of
foreign banks cannot be regarded as a genuine foreign debt; instead it can be regarded as transactions within the foreign banks, between the mother bank in a foreign country and the subsidiary branch bank in Korea. Because of such liberal view of the government without a functioning regulatory framework, the sharp increase in short-term borrowings of domestic branches of foreign banks had raised an alarming risk.
Leveraged Banks and Household Debt
Since the Asian financial crisis, the Korean Banking sector has expanded rapidly not only in asset size but also in its variety of services. Notably, in 2004, the total loans issued by domestic banks exceeded the total deposits. Banks have issued bonds to mobilize additional money for lending. For example, the total amount of bank bonds issued quadrupled between 2001 and 2008. These rapidly increasing loans have been channeled more to households, in particular to housing-related sectors. Total loans provided to the household sector by financial institutions have also quadrupled during the period, from 165.8 trillion won to 648.3 trillion won (KSI). This high ratio of housing-related loans was closely linked with the housing bubble from 2001 to 2006. As the housing prices growth was almost always positive with an annual change in purchase price of 20%, people borrowed money with far lower interest rates and invested in the real estate market.
However, such circumstances resulted in households vulnerable to credit tightening as they have a low savings rate and high leverage—a debt-to-income ratio of 142.5% (KSI).{1.63582E,19}.
Net Financial Assets in Individual Sector (in trillions KRW)
The above table shows the rising financial debt of individuals and the substantial decrease in financial assets in 2008. The loss in net financial assets was due to stock market and exchange rate changes. On top of the asset loss, the aggressively risen household debt had a significantly negative impact on private consumption. Evidently, the high leveraging of the household sector makes it more vulnerable to the global credit crunch. Since the crisis, deleveraging in the household and the corporate sector weakened household consumption and corporate investment. In particular, the low-income households will be much more vulnerable to the economic downturn than large firms..
Foreign Exchange Rate Policy: A Leaning-against-the-Wind Strategy
The Lee Myung-bak administration, inaugurated in 2007, adopted a leaning-against-the-wind strategy in managing Korea’s foreign exchange rate. Initially the new administration preferred a weak won for
export promotion Then as the global crisis worsened, the Korean government switched its foreign exchange rate policy to defend the won at approximately 1,000 won to the U.S. dollar while depreciation pressures were going up on account of the escalating global financial crisis. Because of this inconsistent policy position, speculators attacked on the Korean currency in the offshore NDF markets. After only 10 months of the establishment of Lee Myong-bak administration in February of 2008, foreign exchange reserves decreased more than $61 billion (Bank of Korea). A majority portion of the decreased foreign exchange reserves seems to have been spent uselessly for defending Korea’s foreign exchange rate from speculative attacks. The leaning-against-the-wind policy contributed to the initial depreciation of Won, as well as the draining of foreign reserve.
Conclusion
The increasing exposure to external risks attributed to the unregulated increase in short-term loans, leverage in household debt and the inconsistent foreign exchange policy. While liberalizing the inward and outward capital flows, the government did not fully recognized the potential risks that foreign bank branches will pose as cross-border financial intermediation is fully liberalized. Systemic regulatory measures have not been introduced appropriately to supervise the financial intermediation activities of branches of foreign banks. Also, the government failed to stabilize the housing market, leaving the households fully exposed to liquidity risks. In addition, the sudden change in foreign exchange policy created the situation which promoted speculative attacks on the Korean currency and increased financial vulnerability to the current global financial shock.
In spite of the unsuccessful risk prevention pre-crisis, the government reacted to the global
environmental changes keenly. In October 2008, the government announced ―The Global Financial Market Instability Subjugation Act‖, initiating government programs for banks’ overseas debts to provide liquidity in the Korean Won. Also, in 2009, the former Head of the Finance Committee followed up the post-crisis policies with tighter cross-boarder banking regulations and bailout plans for Foreign Exchange Bank.
Works Cited:
1. K. Myung Gu, ―Global Financial Crisis and Systematic Risks in the Korean Banking Sector‖ in Academic paper series on Korea (eds.) Capital Flows and the International Financial System Economic Policy 16, no.32 (2008): 51-82.
2. World Economic Outlook: Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2008). Journal of Financial Stability 4(4) (2010): 307-312.
3. World Economic Outlook Update: Global Economic Slump Challenges Policies (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, January 2009).
4. ―Global Economic Policies and Prospects,‖ note by the staff of the International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 19 March 2009).
5. Deleveraging is the process of banks’ paying off any existing debt on their balancesheets and closing credit lines. 6. Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacifi c (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, November 2008).
第二篇:《提梁机基础设计》
非定点模式提梁机基础设计
1. 结构形式及结构简化
提梁机基础采用预制桩基础，轨道基础采用C30钢筋。砼设计桩号为直径500AB型预制桩，桩长是25米，间距3.45m～4.45m，基础分为两条，基础靠近存梁台座处的基础与横移滑道轨道基础相交时，采用固结方式，相交处采用直径1.5m的长25m的钻孔桩为基础。基础梁一般截面是1.8m*2.0m，基础梁根据结构设置沉降缝，间距不等。
基础二非定点起吊部分间距采用4m，定点起吊部分根据定点起吊的位置确定预制桩的位置和间距，基础梁一般截面采用1.8*2m，大承台处截面是2.5*2m， 2. 荷载计算
（1）.基础每米自重(偏安全地按照最大基础截面计算)
q=2*1*2.5*26=130KN/m（也可在软件中自动计算，此处采用软件值，自重系数-1.04）
(2).提梁机提梁时通过车轮传递给基础的集中力（考虑到单台提梁机自重是445t，32m梁900t，每台提梁机32个车轮） 故：每个车轮传递给基础梁的集中力标准值是： P=(445+900/2)*10/32=279.7KN
由于每个车轮所能承受的最大车轮压力是335KN>279.7KN, 每个车轮传递给基础梁的集中力设计值是： P=1.2*279.7=335KN 材料性能指标：{1.63582E,19}.
（1） C30砼
轴心抗压强度：fc14.3MPa ft1.43MPa (2)钢筋
一级钢筋：fy210MPa fy/210MPa 二级钢筋 fy300MPa fy/300MPa 3. 结构简化及模型的建立
结构采用midas建立模型，根据提梁机车轮间距的布置，计算中可将将提梁机基础模拟为10跨等跨连续梁结构，单跨跨度为5m，下端与直径0.5m，厚度0.1m的预制桩基刚性连接，并将基础梁下面两根桩简化为一根，形成一个整体平面框架结构，同时忽略地基土对基础梁和桩基的弹性约束作用。为得到提梁机基础梁的受力最不利分布情况，可将提梁机移动时传递给基础的力分为两种荷载工况，计算并将结构绘图如下：
（1）工况一：车轮从一跨起点行走时受力简化如下图：
结构计算模型
弯矩图
剪力图
-1840.3
轴力图
由上述计算可知结果如下：
（2） 工况一：车轮从一跨跨中行走时受力简化如下图：
结构计算模型
弯矩图
剪力图
第三篇:《最优化matlab》
function f=myfun(x);{1.63582E,19}.
f=sin(x)+exp(x);
options=optimset('display','iter')
[x fval exitflaf output]=fminbnd(@myfun,0, 5,options)
options =
Display: 'iter'
MaxFunEvals: []
MaxIter: []
TolFun: []
TolX: []
FunValCheck: []
OutputFcn: []
PlotFcns: []
ActiveConstrTol: []
Algorithm: []
AlwaysHonorConstraints: []
BranchStrategy: []
DerivativeCheck: []
Diagnostics: []
DiffMaxChange: []
DiffMinChange: []
FinDiffType: []
GoalsExactAchieve: []
GradConstr: []
GradObj: []
HessFcn: []
Hessian: []
HessMult: []
HessPattern: []
HessUpdate: []
InitialHessType: []
InitialHessMatrix: []
InitBarrierParam: []
InitTrustRegionRadius: []
Jacobian: []
JacobMult: []
JacobPattern: []
LargeScale: []
LevenbergMarquardt: []
LineSearchType: []
MaxNodes: []
MaxPCGIter: []
MaxProjCGIter: []
MaxRLPIter: []
MaxSQPIter: []
MaxTime: []
MeritFunction: []
MinAbsMax: []
NodeDisplayInterval: []
NodeSearchStrategy: []
NonlEqnAlgorithm: []
NoStopIfFlatInfeas: []
ObjectiveLimit: []
PhaseOneTotalScaling: []
Preconditioner: []
PrecondBandWidth: []
RelLineSrchBnd: []
RelLineSrchBndDuration: []
ScaleProblem: []
Simplex: []
SubproblemAlgorithm: []
TolCon: []
TolConSQP: []
TolGradCon: []
TolPCG: []
TolProjCG: []
TolProjCGAbs: []
TolRLPFun: []
TolXInteger: []
TypicalX: []
UseParallel: []